Book Review: \u3cem\u3eRed Famine: Stalin\u27s War on Ukraine\u3c/em\u3e by Crocco, Natalia Paola
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International 
Journal 
Volume 14 Issue 1 Article 14 
5-7-2020 
Book Review: Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine 
Natalia Paola Crocco 
Center for Studies on Genocide (CEG), Tres de Febrero University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp 
Recommended Citation 
Crocco, Natalia Paola (2020) "Book Review: Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine," Genocide Studies and 
Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 14: Iss. 1: 164-165. 
DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1725 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol14/iss1/14 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized 
editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu. 
Natalia Paola Crocco. “Book Review: Red Famine: Stalin´s War on Ukraine.“ Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, 1(2020): 164-165. 
©2020 Genocide Studies and Prevention.  
https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1725
 
Book Review: Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine
Natalie Paola Crocco
Center for Studies on Genocide (CEG), Tres de Febrero University
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Red Famine: Stalin´s War on Ukraine
Anne Applebaum
New York, Doubleday (Penguin Random House LLC), 2017
461 Pages; Price: $35.00 Hardcover
Reviewed by Natalia Paola Crocco
Center for Studies on Genocide (CEG), Tres de Febrero University
Red Famine is a book in which Anne Applebaum, winner of a Pulitzer Prize, focuses on the 
Soviet famine of the 1930s. For the author it was implemented in a planned and systematic way by 
Stalin against Ukraine artificially. It is the result of a history of submission from Russia to Ukraine 
that has its genesis in Tsarism, is accentuated after the Revolution in 1917 and culminates in 1933 
with the process of artificial famine. The author starts from a hypothesis of first Russian, and then 
Soviet hostility towards Ukraine which is based on various historical sources and documents. 
The main questions that run through the book are: what happened between 1917 and 1934? What 
happened during 1932 and 1933? In addition, what place does famine occupy in the history of 
Ukraine and its national movement?
In order to answer these questions, the author makes a genealogical route of the relationship 
between Ukraine and Russia throughout history. In the first place, she stops at the peculiarities 
of Ukraine and its cultural and idiomatic differences with respect to its main neighbours, Poland 
and Russia, emphasizing that it is precisely those that constitute it as a different nation with its 
distinctive language and customs. 
After this introduction she focuses on the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 and its independence 
after the dissolution of the Russian Empire (chapter 1) and the civil war process (1918-1921) 
between the declared People’s Republic of Ukraine and Soviet Russia (Chapters 2 and 3). Then 
she analyses the New State Policy of the Soviet Union in Ukraine during the 1920s (chapter 4), the 
process of collectivization of land in 1930 (chapter 5 and 6) and its failure in 1931 (chapter 7). Once 
the historical route is drawn, Applebaum stops in the process of planning the famine during 1932 
(chapters 8, 9 and 10) and the famine during the spring and summer of 1933 (chapters 11 and 12). 
Finally, the author stops at the consequences of the famine (chapter 13), its cover-up by the Soviet 
government (chapter 14) and a set of conclusions about its current repercussions (chapter 15).
Starting from the idea that due to its nationalist and independence movement, Ukraine 
constituted a danger to the consolidation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Applebaum 
questions the idea that famine was an unwanted effect of the process of collectivization of land and 
argues that Stalin’s goal was planned by finding background since the 1920. These backgrounds 
were the persecution of intellectuals, members of traditional Ukrainian and nationalists, and 
then against the peasantry; mainly the rich peasants (kulaks) that in Stalin’s eyes were the main 
representatives of Ukrainian nationalism and potential members of new revolutions.
The persecution of intellectuals, artists, and writers occurred mainly in the 1920s from arrests, 
murders, and the author points to it as a precedent of premeditated attack against the elite of the 
Ukrainian national culture. As a counterpoint, she argues that the famine of 1921 was the product 
of the first process of collectivization and delivery of crops and grains to the Soviet government 
since Stalin himself recognized it and international assistance was received to alleviate the effects 
of starvation. Not so during 1932 and 1933: Applebaum argues that neither collectivization, neither 
bad crops nor the weather caused famine in Ukraine. The collectivization was an initial kick to 
give the conditions that led to it but were not a direct consequence of it. Applebaum affirms that 
it was a planned situation that occurred as a result of the systematic seizure of food from peasant 
households, accompanied by the cutting of routes that they prevented farmers from finding food 
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(this did not happen in the famine of the 1920s), the development of blacklists in villages and 
restrictions on trade.
As in every genocide, Applebaum argues that Stalin did not aim to annihilate all Ukrainians 
but a portion of the national group. For the author, the goal of hunger annihilation was the most 
active and committed Ukrainians with the nationalist project. She starts from this premise by taking 
Raphael Lemkin and criticizing the purely legal and moral uses of the term genocide: she proposes 
it as a category of historical use from which the Ukrainian case can be understood even though at 
the moment of the perpetration of the genocide this category did not exist. The author claims that 
the almost four million Ukrainian victims were the result of a deliberate famine that was part of a 
systematic plan for political purposes to destroy the Ukrainian identity that put Soviet aspirations 
at risk.
Applebaum argues that this fact continues until today and crosses contemporary political 
conflicts between Ukraine and Russia. The author asserts that the main tensions are in the official 
political discourse and are influenced by the presidents’ ties with the communist party. In 2004, 
President Viktor Yuschenko politicized the debate on the facts by arguing that the events were a 
matter of genocide; Yuschenko was the first president who had not been a member of the party. 
The official speech changed radically by assuming Yanukovych, who reversed this debate about 
the responsibility of the famine, for being a pro-Russian ruler. Currently the dispute exceeded the 
official political discourse and reached on the one hand, the Russian speaking Ukrainian society, 
and on the other, the Ukrainian speaking society, which the first accuse of carrying out a cultural 
genocide against the part of the population of non-Ukrainian speakers. Russian speakers deny the 
planned famine while Ukrainian speakers hold it and denounce its denial.
Finally, Applebaum asserts that the silencing and denial of the Soviet genocide against the 
Ukrainian people continues to shape the way in which Ukrainians and Russians think about 
themselves and each other. In this sense, she links the current political problems of Ukraine, such 
as distrust of the State and political corruption with the loss of the political and academic elite as 
a result of the genocide. For her, all these problems must go back to 1933, even if they are current.
